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Abstract
Many disciplines have contributed to the evolving understanding of trauma and oppression. The discipline
of philosophy offers us the opportunity to ask the question: what should we be doing to create conditions of
justice in communities where people have experienced trauma or oppression in relation to their identity? In
this thesis, I will use philosophy to propose ways that we can ameliorate injustice in social and religious
settings, particularly Catholicism. By examining historical and contemporary questions around identity and
the self, I hope to begin to articulate both a specific problem in the Church and identify possible paths
toward creating more just communities for people who identify as LGBTQ Catholics.

Dedication and Acknowledgements
Thanks very much to my advisor Dr. V. Denise James, who stuck with me and helped open my eyes to the
life of the mind; the University Honors Program; my many professors and mentors who challenge me to
seek out a lifelong education; my family, and my friends.
This thesis is dedicated to the courageous individuals around the world who search for love, community,
and an encounter with God amidst structures and societies that challenge their humanity.

Table of Contents

Abstract

Title Page

Introduction: The Elephant in the Room

1

Chapter 1: Justice Through Difference: John Rawls and Iris Marion Young

5

Chapter 2: Trauma and Oppression

24

Chapter 3: Fragmented Identities

42

Conclusions, Limitations, and Steps Forward

54

Page |1

Introduction: The Elephant in the Room
We are handed an identity before having a say in the matter, and we spend our lives
running from it, pretending we have left it behind, or grappling with it as Jacob wrestled
with his angel.
Fenton Johnson, Keeping Faith
In July 2015, Deb Word, the president of Fortunate Families, a support group for
Catholic parents that advocates for the church to embrace their LGBTQ children, was
asked by the New York Times what she would say to Pope Francis if she met him at that
September’s World Meeting of Families in Philadelphia. She replied that she would tell
the Holy Father “we don’t need to put this kind of trauma on a child’s soul.”1
In various ways, Roman Catholicism identifies justice as a key feature of both the
communal life of the Church and of God’s relationship to individual human beings. There
are explicit or implicit mentions of justice in Church doctrine, teaching, and practice. We
find justice mentioned in various books of the Bible, “The Lord loves righteousness and
justice; the earth is full of his unfailing love,” and Catholic social teaching that seeks to
affirm and defend human dignity through confronting certain systems of oppression and
domination.2 The Catholic world’s sustained effort for peace and justice is well
documented, and an exhaustive depiction of its efforts on these fronts is unnecessary
here. Sustained attention to justice is a worthy project. Yet, the Catholic approach seems
to fall short in certain aspects of both the Catholic Church’s theory and practice of
11

Laurie Goodstein, “Gay and Transgender Catholics Urge Pope Francis to Take a
Stand,” New York Times, July 28, 2015, accessed October 9th, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/29/us/gay-and-transgender-catholics-urge-popefrancis-to-take-a-stand.html?_r=0.
2
Psalms 33:5; Catholic Social Teaching Challenges and Directions, “Catholic Social
Teaching”, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops.
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justice, particularly in regard to the status of women and the LGBTQ community within
the Catholic Church.3 In this thesis, I will focus on the status and lives of LGBTQ
members of the Catholic Church.
Catholicism differentiates and excludes certain sexual orientations and gender
identities that fall outside of the Church’s teaching that affirm heterosexual, consecrated
marriages aimed at procreation and unity. Catholicism’s continual chasm between its
LGBTQ members and the full life of the Church has emerged as an increasing source of
conflict, disagreement, and tension, especially in recent years. As many governments,
legislatures, and other Christian denominations and religious communities around the
world have made greater overtures toward LGBTQ individuals and have taken concrete
steps to integrate them more fully into the social fabric, the Catholic Church seems to
have become harsher in how it treats its LGBTQ members in doctrine, rhetoric, and
practice. 4 For every apparent opening, such as Pope Francis’ now famous quip of “Who
am I to judge?” another story emerges of a gay teacher or vice-principal being fired from
a Catholic high school by the bishop for marrying his or her partner civilly in their

3

I use the term “LGBTQ” throughout to refer to the broader community; however, I do
not mean to equivocate the definitions, identity, and experiences of gays, lesbians,
bisexual persons, transgender persons, queer and questioning persons, etc. I use it simply
as an inclusive reference point. The nuances of Catholic teaching and practice toward gay
couples transgendered persons deserve separate but linked examinations; that, however,
will fall outside of the purview of this particular thesis.
4
A few watershed moments and trends that come to mind are the June 2015 Obergefell
vs. Hodges US Supreme Court Case that legalized gay marriage, state laws that ban
discrimination based on sexual orientation, and renewed affirmation of LGBTQ
individuals, couples, and families within other Christian denominations such as the
Episcopal Church, the Anglican Church, and the United Church of Christ.
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personal lives, or of cold, unrealistic rhetoric yet again finding its way into papal letters
and apostolic exhortations.5
The disconnect between the teaching, rhetoric, and jurisprudence of the Church
and the truths revealed by autobiographical accounts, relationships, and advocacy from
the LGBTQ Catholic community is creating subtle cracks and psychic harms across many
unique Catholic communities across the world. Seeking to employ both the
methodological tool of problem articulation based in pragmatist, feminist philosophy and
the relational, sacramental language of the Church, I will undertake a textual analysis to
explore the delicate interplay between theories and practices of justice, identity, trauma,
and oppression. By doing so, I hope to identify, articulate, and argue for the existence of
a major problem in the way the Catholic Church treats its LGBTQ members.
Additionally, as a cisgender, heterosexual male who has grown up in the American
Catholic Church and remained active in it, I also write from a place of humility and
caution, recognizing my status as an observer to the LGBTQ Catholic community.
If the realities of the stunted life offered to LGBTQ Catholics are not
acknowledged, apologized for, and ameliorated in a constructive manner, the social
bonds and cohesion of the Church are likely to further regress. Despite this gloomy
potential forecast, an examination of the growing body of literature and autobiographical
voices from LGBTQ Catholics that affirm identity as both gay and Catholic reveals that
the path forward lies in listening to the lessons about identity, harm, and healing
5

One such example of many firings, dismissals, and investigations is the 2013 firing of
Mark Zmuda from Eastside Catholic School in Seattle, which led to continued protests
from students, parents, and community members calling for his full reinstatement and a
fuller dialogue over the necessity and injustice of the matter. See
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/21/seattle-catholic-schools-firing-gay-viceprincipal for coverage and links to other sources.
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embedded in the stories of those people whose lives are often treated as paradoxes and
foreign amidst the warmth of Catholic community. There is an uncomfortable separation
splintering the Catholic Church, and it can be found in living rooms, high school
classrooms, and confessionals. Its face is marked by separation, exclusion, and confusion,
and it permeates the consciousness of LGBTQ Catholics, their family members and
friends, and, indeed, all members of the Church in various ways. I argue that if one
begins to look closely at this reality through the lenses of philosophy and narrative, both
the inconsistencies and pressures that allowed it to spread throughout Catholic
communities and paths forward toward healing, justice, and reconciliation emerge.
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Chapter 1: Justice Through Difference: John Rawls and Iris
Marion Young
Justice is a mechanism to retain order, fairness, and a sense of moral rightness in
society. Each society has its idiosyncratic history, rhetoric, and context for deliberating
and organizing community life that is crucial to that society’s flourishing. In Justice and
the Politics of Difference, Iris Marion Young proposes an “enabling concept of justice”
that affirms individual difference and an understanding that the law should embrace the
various embodied social identities of human beings.6 Young contrasts her vision of
justice with John Rawls’s well-known theory of justice as fairness. Rawls argues that
society must place fairness above all else in an effort to promote an egalitarian liberal
freedom that ensures any question of justice that emerges from an original position will
purportedly ensure all parties are “rational and mutually disinterested”.7 While
acknowledging Rawls’ theory of justice as an admirable effort, Young still deems it an
“utopian fiction” that hides the structural, damaging treatment embedded in systems of
justice.8 She argues that a critical examination of our acceptance of justice as fairness is
necessary due to pervasive institutional conditions of oppression and subjugation that
deny individual difference. These conditions often debilitate and destroy the very justice
that they wish to affirm and regulate within communities and societies.
I will begin this chapter by sketching a brief outline of John Rawls’ theory of
justice as fairness. Subsequently, I will contrast it with Iris Marion Young’s discussion of
justice from her starting point that the “philosopher is always socially situated”, whether
6

Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 39.
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 13.
8
Young 104.
7
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they admit it or not.9 I will argue that Young’s position affirms that any particular
examination of justice in community must begin by recognizing and rooting out
oppression and social domination. Young celebrates the differences within and amidst
diverse social groups and warns that laws and policies that advocate for the “melting
away of differences” put certain groups at risk for oppression. In doing so, she outlines a
vision for how specific societies can embrace and cultivate a thriving social ecosystem
that respects group differences to achieve a more robust justice at that particular time.10
Rawls & Justice as Fairness
Over the past several decades, Rawlsian fairness has arguably been the dominant
theory of justice that has embedded itself in legal decisions, academic parlance, and
political discourse. By his own account, Rawls set out to “…work out a theory of justice
that is a viable alternative to these doctrines which have long dominated our
philosophical tradition.”11 The philosophers that Rawls set his sights on were the
utilitarians- such as Mill, Bentham, and Smith- who deftly advocated for the greater good
of many, sometimes at the expense of individual rights. While Rawls recognized the
intellectual weight behind their claims on morality and justice, he appreciated the
contractual justice of thinkers like Kant and Locke and had a deep concern for protecting
the inherent rights of all individuals amidst the chaos and tumult of organized societies
like democracies. Therefore, his years-long development of A Theory of Justice centered
on his desire for a way to bring all peoples to the same table when any difficult question
arose surrounding right, wrong, and the just solution to a public problem. How could

9

Ibid 5.
Ibid 47.
11
Rawls 3.
10
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different people- born into vastly different homes, socioeconomic statues, and
communities- find justice? Moreover, is it possible for citizens with different agendas and
deeply held beliefs, within systems of “especially deep inequalities”, to come together
and arrive at a fair, acceptable conclusion for all?12
To answer this question, Rawls created what he called the original position: the
“appropriate, initial status quo” that ostensibly serves as an impartial arbiter in all
disputes.13 To create this original position, Rawls conjures up the metaphor of a “veil of
ignorance” that obscures any self-knowledge amongst the parties involved in the
situation. To explain, imagine four hypothetical people sitting around a table somewhere
in America: two men and two women. One man is a thirty-two year old investment
banker that lives in downtown Manhattan; he identifies as Mexican-American,
heterosexual, and single. The other man is twenty-five, white, and a young medical
technician in rural Ohio; he’s gay, and has been in a committed relationship for several
years. One of the women is a heterosexual, black college student studying physics; the
other is a Seminole woman who’s a teacher in Florida, and is married to an immigrant
from Iraq. All four have been pulled into a dispute that they must resolve fairly and in the
most just manner possible. Rawls was deeply concerned that each person’s individual
biased history and story- comprised of racial and ethnic identities, social ties, beliefs,
values, and so on- would distort any attempt to see the fairest solution. Therefore, the veil
induces temporary amnesia on all four individuals. Stripped of their identities and
markers by which they approach life and decision making, they are theoretically free to

12
13

Ibid 7.
Ibid 18.
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deliberate, discuss, and reason their way to the fairest solution, all four knowing that they
could be anyone in the world once they regain their memory.
These four people are equipped only with the facts at hand and the knowledge that
each of them wishes to obtain their share of the primary goods present in their specific
society, which Rawls splits into two categories: the social primary goods of “rights and
liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth” and natural primary goods like
“health and vigor, intelligence and imagination” which are less tied to the process of
deliberative justice.14 Interestingly, he also identifies self-respect as arguably the most
important primary good; I will return to this later. For Rawls, the original position is the
perfect solution to the inherent biases, inequalities, and injustices that distort individual
rights within pluralistic societies. This new system sought to integrate both the standard
utilitarian goal of maximizing utility at any given moment and the liberal foundation that
earlier contract theorists had laid down. Each person, not fully knowing themselves but
harboring an internal sense of the good and that each of them lives a markedly different
life in a free society, should aim for the fairest solution that will benefit the least
advantaged among them once they become themselves again; furthermore, their ultimate
decision should have the least advantaged of the entire society in mind. To accomplish
this, he lays out two principles that make up the foundation of any and every foray into
the hypothetical room where deliberations from the original position occur.
These two Rawlsian “principles of justice” that each rational decision maker
utilizes in mulling over his or her course of action attempt to address the inextricable
relationship between liberty and difference. After explaining them early on in A Theory of

14

Ibid 62.
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Justice, Rawls defended, reassessed, and reflected on these two principles for the rest of
his career in texts such as Political Liberalism and Justice as Fairness. The first principle
articulates that all citizens hold an “extensive” set of basic liberties that are to be
defended at all costs, so long as they do not infringe on others’ liberties. Building off the
first, the second principle addresses inequality. It states that inequalities should be
tempered as far as they are “to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged”, and that all
public offices and positions be equally accessible in the interest of fairness.15 When
employed together, Rawls advocates that the liberty principle and the difference principle
defend each individual’s rights as far as possible whilst attempting to ameliorate, to some
extent, the inequalities and disadvantages that arise among each person.16 In the hopes of
illuminating why Rawls genuinely thought he was providing a paradigm through which
all questions of justice could be laid to rest, I will give a short account of the second
principle before moving to the first, since Rawls repeatedly states that the second flows
from the first in what he deems a “lexical order.”17
To illustrate the second principle, Rawls asks us to imagine the differences
between the people that make up the entrepreneurial class as opposed to poorer, unskilled
laborers. There are many factors that preceded this point in time for both peoples,
including the specific community, class, and circumstances that each was born into. The
second principle utilizes geometry and economics to remark that any initial or entrenched
inequality is acceptable only if “the difference in expectation is to the advantage of the
15

Ibid 60; further articulated on 302.
Ibid 60. The terms I used for the two principles- “Liberty” and “Difference”- are
regularly used by scholarly sources, although some variations exist elsewhere.
17
Ibid 42. In a lengthy footnote, Rawls explains and grounds the historical meaning of
the lexical or “lexicographical” in the assumption that concepts such as goods, rights, and
morals have relative degrees of primacy and importance.
16

P a g e | 10

man who is worse off, in this case the representative unskilled worker.”18 There are
different ways in which the second principle can be interpreted, carried out, and
established as outcomes based on interpretations of Rawls’ terms “open to all” and
“everyone’s advantage”.19 They unfold in a relative sequence: natural aristocracy, natural
liberty, liberal equality, and democratic equality. Rawls ultimately settles on democratic
equality as the preferred and natural outcome for free societies and says that such equality
flows from a healthy synthesis of the sub-principles of fair equality of opportunity and
difference.20 Most of Rawls’ discussion of the second principle takes place in the realm
of economics and utility, which are not the direct focus of our discussion of justice,
though definitely related. Through this principle, he attempts to stem the tide of mass
material inequality. He self-admittedly states that he is not entirely comfortable dealing
with the different degrees of injustice that can ensure in free and materially unequal
societies. He does, though, give a warning to any society that allows for inequality:
The point to note here is that while the difference principle is, strictly speaking, a
maximizing principle, there is a significant distinction between the cases that fall short of
the best arrangement. A society should try to avoid the region where the marginal
contributions of those better off are negative, since, other things equal, this seems a
greater fault than falling short of the best scheme when those contributions are positive.
The even larger difference between rich and poor makes the latter even worse off, and
this violates the principle of mutual advantage as well as democratic equality (17).21

Rawls admits the potential dangers of accepting degrees of inequality for the sake
of the coherence of his system; however, this is another area where others have offered
critiques. He recounts one critique, that “the final formulation of Rawls’ first principle of

18

Ibid 78.
Ibid 65.
20
Ibid 75.
21
Ibid 79.
19
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justice is stated as follows: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive
total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.”22
This first principle deals primarily with the actual system that governs and regulates free
society. Rawls identifies certain liberties that are necessary for citizens to flourish and
maximize their freedoms without infringing on the freedoms of others. These include:
political liberty (the right to vote and to be eligible for public office), together with
freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom
of the person along with the right to hold (personal) property; and freedom from arbitrary
arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of law.23

Rawls sets these out as his basic priorities for any given free society because they aim for
a moderate Aristotelian path “between dogmatism and intolerance on the one side, and an
a reductionism which regards religion and morality as mere preferences on the other.”24
In examining the theories of justice that had come before him, Rawls recognizes a
constant tension between the competing interests, beliefs, and desires in plural
democracies and the primacy of rights or goods. In his view, societies grounded first by
certain unalienable liberties would gradually harmonize and balance the good because of
the urgency and relative equality of rights.
In sketching out the first principle Rawls names several contingencies by which
liberties can be restricted; however, this restriction can only happen “for the sake of
liberty itself.”25 These contingencies- that a person’s liberties can be less extensive but
equal to all other persons, or that a person’s liberty can be unequal as long as their
“freedom is better secured”- aim to address the obvious reality that inequality and

22

Ibid 302.
Ibid 61.
24
Ibid 243.
25
Ibid 244.
23
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affronts against liberties have existed in every human society that ever purported to be
free. In the hopes of addressing the complex and often disappointing realities of modern
society, these contingencies provide sorts of goals by which relative inequality and
limited freedoms can exist and still hit the mark of substantive justice as fairness. In the
same section, Rawls identifies further addendums to the primacy of liberty. He identifies
two ways in which liberties might be limited that questions of justice perhaps cannot
address.
The first are the cases in which personal accident, history, or government limits
liberty by necessary or reasonable measure; Rawls cites the “natural features of the
human situation, as well as the lesser liberty of children” to explain these devalued
freedoms.26 One easy example is society’s relatively accepted rule that people cannot yell
“Fire!” in a crowded movie theatre or “Bomb!” on an airplane in order to falsely incite
panic. Although this limits the personal liberty of speech, Rawls acknowledges the
necessity for some order. There is obviously a tense grey line at the heart of these first
limitations, and those debates have raged for centuries and will continue for centuries
more. The second case he identifies, interestingly, is when injustice “already exists” and
is brought upon certain individuals by others, either through intolerance, contrary
convictions, or some combination thereof.27
In this second limitation, Rawls freely acknowledges that his theory of justice
cannot account for all unjust circumstances. However, his optimism and seeming shrug
toward the realities and complexities certain structural injustice leaves a lingering
26

To read how Rawls has been critiqued for his treatment- or lack thereof- of justice in
the family, see Susan Moller Okin’s Justice, Gender, and the Family and the works of
Martha Nussbaum and Carole Pateman, among others.
27
Ibid 244-5.
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question as to whether an idyllic, rational, universal theory of justice is a desirable
endpoint of the endless endeavor toward better, stronger, and fairer society. To quote:
But men’s propensity to injustice is not a permanent aspect of community life; it is
greater or less depending on social institutions, and in particular on whether these are just
or unjust. A well-ordered society tends to eliminate or at least to control men’s
inclinations to injustice, and therefore warring or intolerant sects, say, are much less
likely to exist, or to be a danger, once such a society is established. How justice requires
us to meet injustice is a very different problem from how best to cope with the inevitable
limitations and contingencies of human life.28

How can individuals and groups cope with injustice? Rawls identifies societal institutions
as responsible for injustice; accordingly, we are to believe that the Rawlsian pursuit of
justice takes place outside of those parameters. However, these institutions are willingly
co-opted elsewhere in his work. He seems to say that structural injustice and intolerance
that is aimed at certain individuals and groups of individuals exist, but it is a problem for
a different place and a different time. This is a vicious cycle, because Rawls wishes to
present a universal theory of justice that says to any society or community that counts
itself as free and asks: how well are you guarding your liberties, and how best do you aim
for fairness while tempering inequality? If Rawls is making normative claims by
theorizing, it is troubling to allow him off the hook for recognizing these different forms
of injustice but allowing them to still be part of the cohesive system.
As a final note, Rawls’ discussion of self-respect as “perhaps the most important
primary good” connects to this thesis’s aim to examine how the Church affirms identity
and dignity within its communities- or, perhaps, fails to do so. He writes that self-respect
has two primary attributes: a sense of the person’s own value and his or her “conviction
of the good, his plan of life, is worth carrying out.” Secondly and relatedly, the person

28

Ibid 245.
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must be confident that he or she can fill out those intentions reasonably. 29 If we feel as if
we cannot or should not fulfill our life’s aims- indeed, if we cannot conceive of coming
close to an Aristotelian flourishing- then we may find that “desire and activity become
empty and vain, and we sink into apathy and cynicism.”30 Rawls ties self-esteem to the
interplay between regret and its deeper sense of loss, shame. Whereas regret is a general
feeling of absence or missed opportunity, shame “implies a especially intimate
connection with our person and with those upon whom we depend to confirm the sense of
our own worth.”31 Rawlsian shame becomes moral for because it implies a failure to
participate in the excellences of one’s own life and the lives of others. This, too, is
different from guilt (although shame and guilt can be tied to the same characteristic,
event, or action), because guilt deals with something contrary to the sense of “right and
justice”.32 Shame moves even deeper in the soul and the psyche because they imply
“blemishes in the person.”33 If the human experience of shame is undesirable and
problematic within even a liberal Rawlsian system of justice, then warning bells should
be ringing for any community that identifies justice as part of its bedrock.
Rawls’ overall effort toward a theory of justice, although substantive, is
problematic. If someone wishes to offer a universal theory and method for justice, it must
proceed from the acknowledgement of the messiness and irrationality of human
relationships in social settings. Although Rawls offers a beautiful vision of reason and
fairness in the pursuit of justice, grounded in the idealism those that came before him like
29

Ibid 440.
Ibid 440.
31
Ibid 443; Rawls mentions that his definition of shame is indebted to William
McDougall.
32
Ibid 445.
33
Ibid 444.
30
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Kant, it does not address how human beings historically have acted in community and
continue to act today, even in spite of a growing value and care for reason. In order to
combat systemic injustice such as racism, sexism, homophobia, and religious
discrimination- which are directly tied to the material inequality that Rawls attempts to
ameliorate in his second principle of justice- we must look at the reality of peoples’ lives
instead of a purportedly rational ideal.
With a simple yet profound way to defend individual rights and liberties and
affirm pluralism at the same time, many writers have built on ‘justice as fairness’ and
have applied it to many corners of society. Lawyers, policy makers, and judges
championed Rawlsian justice, and the American legal ecosystem is infused with fairness
from the top down. However, in order to get to the root of the interwoven injustices that
face many groups of people in societies like contemporary America, we must turn away
from Rawls toward a feminist philosopher that identified people through their complex
histories, their relationships, and their bodies: Iris Marion Young.
Young’s Politics of Difference
Unlike John Rawls, Iris Marion Young did not seek a unifying theory of justice.
To her, such theories implied that one correct frame of justice exists for all time and all
places, outside of human experience and history. This system “implicitly conflates moral
knowledge with scientific knowledge” and assumes that any questions of justice can be
divorced from the experiences that the given members of a community live through,
whether positive or negative.34 That was not the world that Young lived in or wrote
about. She reveled in the positive contributions and vibrancy of diversity and difference;

34

Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 4.
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however, she was disturbed by her increasing awareness of the overt and underlying
oppression carried out against peoples on a daily basis. Given this sobering reality,
Young sought to discuss and wrestle with justice without constructing her own
universalizing theory. In her view, those endeavors- while taken up by many other
philosophers and thinkers, and undoubtedly important- were neither entirely honest nor
desirable. She dealt with an imperfect world that did not often live up to goodness,
rightness, rationality, or fairness. Along with other feminist philosophers such as Susan
Moller Okin and Martha Nussbaum, she critiqued Rawls because his work did not
account for the very real biases and inequalities that were built into the structures,
institutions, and assumptions that make up the original position. In their view, the
perceived impartial sphere where deliberation takes place between fair, decent peoples is
not very impartial at all.
Although important, if liberal fairness is allowed to be the culmination of the
search for justice, something crucial is lost. Young makes it clear that we have told
ourselves a narrative that we are on a gradual uphill track toward perfect fairness,
equality, and justice; furthermore, if we reason and deliberate as hard as we can, we will
arrive there quite happily and safely. At the beginning of the sixth chapter of her book
Justice and the Politics of Difference, “Social Movements and the Politics of Difference”,
Young makes the stakes of this mind-set quite apparent by reflecting on the stories we
tell ourselves about justice and one another:
Today in our society a few vestiges of prejudice and discrimination remain, but we are
working on them, and have nearly realized the dream those Enlightenment fathers dared
to propound…We tell each other this story and make our children perform it for our
sacred holidays- Thanksgiving Day, the Fourth of July, Memorial Day, Lincoln’s
Birthday. We have constructed Martin Luther King Day to fit the narrative so well that
we have already forgotten it took a fight to get it included in the canon year. There is
much truth to this story. Enlightenment ideals of liberty and political equality did and do
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inspire movements against oppression and domination, whose success has created social
values and institutions we would not want to lose…The very worthiness of the narrative,
however, and the achievement of political equality that it recounts, now inspires new
heretics.35

These heretics are welcome and “endorsed” by Young because they wish to make the
case that they are freer than they would be otherwise by affirming their differences and
group identity, not by decimating them at the altar of the veil of ignorance.36 Black
Americans, indigenous peoples, LGBTQ religious peoples, and scores of others who
broadly fall into how Young describes social groups in Justice all experience various
forms of oppression, domination, and marginalization in their communities because the
differences that form their identities have been ostensibly swept away in an effort to see
the world blindly and dismiss existent prejudices, hatreds, and power imbalances as relics
of the past. I will outline Young’s main assessment and critique from Justice about the
distributive paradigm and how it dismantles the “ideal of impartiality” that obscures and
ignores human bodies, identities, and relationships.
The Distributive Paradigm
In order to have any conversation about justice, Young points out that one must
recognize the common thread throughout the history of philosophy that skews toward
equivocating questions of justice with questions of distribution. She calls this
phenomenon the “distributive paradigm”, by which she means:
…a configuration of elements and practices which define an inquiry: metaphysical
presuppositions, unquestioned terminology, characteristic questions, lines of reasoning,
specific theories and their typical scope and mode of application. The distributive
paradigm defines social justice as the morally proper distribution of social benefits and
burdens among society’s members. Paramount among these are wealth, income, and
other material resources. The distributive definition of justice also includes, however,
nonmaterial social goods such as rights, opportunities, power, and self-respect. What
35
36

Young 157.
Ibid.
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marks the distributive paradigm is a tendency to conceive social justice and distribution
as coextensive concepts.37

Rawls’ theory of justice and his two principles immediately come to mind. Through
direct and indirect reference, it is clear that she has Rawls and others like him in mind
here and throughout the entire text by beginning her entire examination of justice as a
critique of the entire vantage point from which her predecessors had started. Young
points out that this way of viewing justice is so pervasive and intuitive that most critics of
an increasingly dominant Rawls-influenced liberalism still use the discourse of
distribution to voice their concerns, from the socialists to the Marxists to the
communitarian Michael Walzer.38 All of this is particularly troubling for Young because,
intentionally or unintentionally, it recreates human beings as “nodes, points in a social
field”, devoid of all of their human intricacy, messiness, and social context and
relationships.39 In examining the implications of the academy’s collectively blind
deference to the distributive paradigm, Young singled out two consequences that
debilitated endeavors for more robust discussions and public implementations of justice:
an ignorance of how discussions of material redistribution “presuppose and obscure”
institutional context, and a distorted picture of how non-material goods- such as rights,
self-respect, and opportunities- function in the lives of ordinary people in the real
world.40
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To Young, it is clear that distorted material distribution and inequality of wealth
are deep injustices that need to be tackled in societies around the world. Critiquing the
implicit portrayal of justice in general meaning solely those particular injustices does not
mean that someone like her does not care about ameliorating grossly disproportionate
economic and material wealth. It simply means that there are other pressing matters of
justice in contemporary society that fall outside of this realm, such as the residents of a
small town organizing and protesting against a waste treatment plant being built near
their waterways and homes or another town being decimated by the major employer
shutting down their factory without any consultation or warning. In situations like these,
material compensation and jobs are conflated with “decision-making power and
procedures”; racial and ethnic stereotypes in media, and corollary public aggressions and
courtroom inequities, or questions about the “division of labor and meaningful work” all
make up these injustices which are not tied directly to distribution.41 For Young, those
who critique the distributive paradigm from a Marxist lens miss the crucial point that
capital class relations and property are not the only contexts for domination.42
By desiring a broader institutional context for examining claims of justice or
injustice, Young means to include:
…Any structures or practices, the rules or norms that guide them, and the language and
symbols that mediate social interactions within them, in institutions of state, family, and
civil society, as well as the workplace…insofar as they condition people’s ability to
participate in determining their actions and their ability to develop and exercise their
capacities.43
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To sum up, Young identifies three clear non-distributive issues that can be addressed:
decision-making, division of labor, and culture.44
The other part of her critique of the paradigm centers on her dismay at other
theorists’ lack of recognition of the limits of distributive analysis. This lack of
recognition “reifies aspects of social life that are better understood as a function of rules
and relations rather as things.”45 For instance, she again critiques Rawls for talking about
rights and duties as if they were objects that could be counted as they come off of an
assembly line, or quantifiable units to be assembled, disassembled, and redistributed at
will. By asking what it even means to distribute rights, Young points to her underlying
charge that rights, duties, self-respect, and other phenomena are social and relational;
they are “social relationships that enable or constrain action.” Power, too, is distorted by
the distributive paradigm; while theorists often have good intent in writing and reflecting
about how to better spread it around societies, Young contends that the very
commodification of power as an object rather than as “processes”, then we will never get
to the root of so many of the pervasive, intertwined injustices that exist.
Breaking Down the Ideal of Impartiality
Later in Justice and the Politics of Difference, Young uses her claims about moral
reasoning and notions of justice to specifically identify the problems with idealizing
impartiality within legal systems and communities. Although liberal, impartial rights
might make sense if justice simply is meant to deal with the “impersonal public contexts
of law, bureaucracy, and the regulation of economic competition,” Young advocates that
the relational nature of individuals and the social function of our identities make
44
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impartiality an errant aim.46 One key way that impartiality inhibits individual and social
flourishing is its reduction of difference to a supposed unity that abstracts us from
“situation, feeling, affiliation, and point of view.”47 These things tie human beings to
earthly imperfections and messiness, which contrast with the often impartial, theoretical
abstracts that men have tried to cement as reasonable and ideal for centuries. This
impartiality curiously appeals to the logic and tradition of the Church, which lives a dual
reality between its pastoral rhetoric that appeals to people in a relational, emotional, and
even loving sense versus its institutional law that ties a masculine impartiality to natural
law that fixes the universe irreparably above and beyond the lived experiences of those
below, including its LGBTQ members.
It is the work of a separate thesis to fully examine and attempt to locate the state
of justice in the Catholic Church. In the Catechism of the Catholic Church, a sort of
official summary of beliefs offered by Saint Pope John Paul II in 1992, a vision of justice
is offered that seems somewhat emancipatory and affirmative of the individual:
1943 Society ensures social justice by providing the conditions that allow associations
and individuals to obtain their due.
1944 Respect for the human person considers the other "another self." It presupposes
respect for the fundamental rights that flow from the dignity intrinsic of the person.
1945 The equality of men concerns their dignity as persons and the rights that flow from
it.48

By employing the language of dues, the first sentence seems to conceive of social justice
as primarily material, but also relational; the subsequent two lines affirm that by speaking
of inherent dignity that flows between the self and the other.49
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However, in Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (later Pope Benedict XVI)’s letter from
the office of the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith entitled “Considerations
Regarding Proposals To Give Legal Recognition to Unions Between Homosexual
Persons”, a slightly different vision of justice is laid out:
Differentiating between persons or refusing social recognition or benefits is unacceptable
only when it is contrary to justice. The denial of the social and legal status of marriage to
forms of cohabitation that are not and cannot be marital is not opposed to justice; on the
contrary, justice requires it.50

I do not wish to exclusively focus on gay marriage or the legal parameters of it here, for
the parameters of the livelihoods of LGBTQ Catholics both encompass and transcend that
important discussion. However, it is worth highlighting Ratzinger’s vision of justice
seems to include discrimination and subjugation of LGBTQ people (and not just
Catholics, for this document discusses both church and civil marriage) by necessity in
order to keep a just, orderly social framework from collapsing.
Young offers a different vision of justice that embraces people in their
idiosyncrasies and views them as relational beings whose lives, interests, and aims are
irrevocably tied up in those of others. This speaks to the deeply communal notions of
solidarity, sacrament, and a common good that threads throughout the universal Catholic
Church; indeed, the church’s vision of social, environmental, and material justice finds a
good deal of synchronicity with Young, if not the Church’s relative oppression of women
and LGBTQ peoples, as explored in this thesis. Thus, it would seem that an approach to
justice akin to Young would be helpful and consistent if applied to the areas where the
49
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Church’s relational justice veers sharply away toward a colder, impartial, universal law
that cleaves bodies and relationships: matters of sexuality, identity, and relationship. To
get to the heart of the paradoxes, hypocrisies, and suffering faced by LGBTQ Catholics,
it seems clear that the Catholic Church must assess its core definitions of justice and see
where and how incongruences seep into rhetoric and practice.
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Chapter 2: Trauma and Oppression
Just communities are comprised of people who are allowed to develop and live
their identities free of oppression or attack. However, within communities all over the
world, groups of people are routinely demoralized and disallowed from participating as
full members of community life. In the Catholic world, many LGBTQ individuals walk a
careful line. Some people are welcomed with open arms into parishes and educational
communities; however, others experience, harassment, exclusion, and downright
hostility. LGBTQ individuals across the spectrum undergo heightened harassment, from
the roughly 80% of LGBTQ school children who experience bullying in a given school
year to the fact that LGBTQ teens are eight times as likely to attempt suicide than their
cisgender peers.51 It proves difficult to quantitatively wade through the Catholic world to
pinpoint concrete numbers on harassment, bullying, and shunning; however, as shown in
the last chapter, more and more autobiographical and secondary accounts are emerging of
the pain, anger, and loneliness suffered by Catholics who have been told time and time
again that their deepest selves are existential, sinful paradoxes. I wish to connect this pain
to the growing literature and exploration of the nature and function of two distinct, yet
related concepts: trauma and oppression.
Trauma
The American Psychological Association (APA) defines trauma as such:
Trauma is an emotional response to a terrible event like an accident, rape, or natural
disaster. Immediately after the event, shock and denial are typical. Longer-term reactions
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include unpredictable emotions, flashbacks, strained relationships, and even physical
symptoms like headaches and nausea.52

While some LGBTQ Catholics experience identity-rooted physical assaults and violence,
others do not. The language and narratives associated with the effects of trauma give ripe
opportunity to explore how certain aspects of trauma might factor in the lives of LGBTQ
Catholics.
In the introduction to the interdisciplinary collection on trauma that she edited,
Cathy Caruth offers that disciplines from across the academic spectrum are beginning to
turn toward trauma to try and understand and hear “the radical disruptions and gaps of
traumatic experience.”53 Attempting to understand traumatic experiences- the scarring
events of life that sear and destroy any sense of normality, order, and justice- may seem a
futile process in and of itself. However, an increasing number of researchers are
exploring this tenuous space in the hopes of revealing something about how humans
process trauma, damage, and healing in communities. It is particularly salient to examine
trauma in community, because those who undergo it often- but not always- identify with
some particular social group.
In much of the literature surrounding trauma, brushes with death are often the
central catalysts that trigger debilitating consequences, ranging from what is called PTSD
(post traumatic stress disorder) to other, more subtle symptoms that are difficult to
classify and are debated across the field. In his 1994 work Posttraumatic Stress Disorder:
Additional Perspectives, Merrill I. Lipton notes that the more commonly noted causes of
obvious trauma- such as “physical or sexual abuse, auto accidents, war, rape, natural
52
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disasters like storms and earthquakes”- should not exclude “a wide diversity of traumas
that are often overlooked.”54 Outside of readily recognized trauma-inducing experiences,
indirect possible causes traumas are also known and explored by trauma theorists: direct
witnessing of traumatic events, being in relationship with community members that have
experienced trauma, and inner harm from rhetorical, emotional, and spiritual abuse,
which I explore through the lives of LGBTQ Catholics. In trying to paint a picture of how
traumatic experience unfolds, Caruth notes that
The pathology consists, rather, solely in the structure of its experience or reception: the
experience is not assimilated or experienced fully at the time, but only belatedly, in its
repeated possession of the one who experiences it. To be traumatized is to be possessed
by an image or an event.55

Some trauma scholars- such as Shoshana Felman- reflect on the role of witnessing in the
traumatic experience, either by the person undergoing trauma, those explicitly or
implicitly causing the trauma, or secondary and tertiary participants. In his work on
trauma through the lens of historiography, Writing History, Writing Trauma, Frank
LaCapra references Caruth’s evocation of “the voice of trauma emerging from the wound
itself…a voice testifying to the role of victim as witness” as a stark image of who and
what speaks when the seemingly impossible becomes real.
There seem to be two lingering questions for anyone who tries to bring the
language and literature of trauma into an exploration of the lives of LGBTQ Catholics.
First, why use the framework of trauma for a kind of harm that is not necessarily material
and are often inflicted subtly over time, given that by many definitions, it needs to be
associated with death or disaster? Second, how do people who may not be direct victims
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of trauma help bring about processes of healing? Third, if the evolving study of trauma is
based on individual experience, how can it be connected to the larger social groups with
which individuals identify?
Witnessing
To begin, I submit that trauma may find its way into lives and psyches of
secondary and tertiary observers more often than may be realized, especially in
communities. In her contribution to the edited volume Trauma: Explorations in Memory,
Shoshana Felman recounts her experiences and memories from the first iteration of a
graduate class she led at Yale in 1984 entitled ‘Literature and Testimony’. The chapter
covers a great deal of ground; some of its earlier sections recount the implications that
narrative, testimony, and witnessing can have on literature, poetry, and psychoanalysis
through examining some of the works that the class covered, such as Dostoyevsky’s
Notes from the Underground, the work and life of Paul Celan, and The Interpretation of
Dreams by Sigmund Freud. I will focus, however, on what these sections build up to:
Felman’s account of the class’s viewing of Holocaust narratives from the Fortunoff
Video Archive56, and the subsequent ‘crisis’ that the class and its teacher- Felman- found
themselves in. Her decision to have the class ‘move on…from poetry into reality…to
study in a literary class something which is a priori not defined as literary, but is rather of
the order of raw documents- historical and autobiographical’57 was intended to add a
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visceral, more real dimension to the textual landscape the class had previously navigated;
however, she did not expect the outcome this would have.
The first interview Felman focuses on are of a woman’s description of her
relationship to her husband; they were married prior to the war and the Holocaust, and
both were the only survivors from their families. In describing her choice to stay with her
husband after the war despite their estrangement, she said that
The man I married and the man he was after the war were not the same person. And I’m
sure I was not the same person either…but somehow we had a need for each other
because, he knew who I was, he was the only person who knew…He knew who I was,
and I knew who he was…and we’re here, we’re here to tell you the story.58

The multiple levels upon which testimony work make this account shocking and
emotionally powerful; indeed, the major driving force behind the woman’s will to survive
was so her story would exist beyond the confines of events that seemed impossible and
ludicrous. This notion of the seeming non-reality of what Holocaust victims went through
was voiced further by the second interviewee, a young boy who survived the Plashow
camp and was eventually reunited with his parents that he missed desperately; after
surviving the camp and re-joining his parents, however, he discovered that the
“emaciated and disfigured”59 people he encountered did not match up at all with the
identity and imagery he had given them in his head. The symptoms of his trauma started
developing in the years after, and his account- given after initially declining to share his
stories and testimony, raises haunting questions:
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It was always…something you have to forget…It just wasn’t there…For the past thirty
five years I’ve been trying to convince myself that it never happened, that…maybe it
happened, but I wasn’t affected. I walked under the rain without getting wet…
We are what we are…we can change some, but we will never be able to eradicate…what
happened…The big question is: Are we transferring our anxieties, our fears, our
problems, to the generations to come? And this is why I feel we are talking here not only
of the lost generation…this time we are dealing with lost generations. It’s not only us.60

Felman goes on to describe how the class, after having watched these interviews
together in an apartment, went through a sort of crisis in the days and weeks following.
They called Felman to discuss their feelings and talk through some of what was coursing
through their minds and bodies; the friends of the students even reached out to Felman to
report that the experience was the only thing they could seemingly talk about. After
consulting with the Yale psychoanalyst who helped make the viewing possible, she
addressed the students’ feelings of crisis and vulnerability head on and structured the
remainder of the class around them. After working through their own emotions and
thoughts individually and as a group, the final reflections that the class turned into
Felman were “amazingly articulate, reflective, and profound statement[s] of the trauma
they had gone through and of the significance of their assuming the position of the
witness.”61 Felman had created an environment and shared in a very personal experience
in which they crossed some plane of knowing, learning, understanding, and witnessing
that academic work normally entails. In coming exhaustively close to the testimony,
storytelling, and broken and forming narrative identities of the survivors, and after having
immersed themselves in the written, fictional worlds of these same realities in the prior
months, it seems that the students entered a new zone of vulnerability where the stories
and identity of all the people involved, past and present, collided.
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In reflecting on Felman’s conclusions, there is a legitimate question as to whether
current understandings of narrative identity adequately allow for the debilitating effects
of trauma. I will quote Felman in full because it gives the proper scope of what she is
trying to convey to the reader:
I would venture to propose…that teaching in itself, teaching as such, takes place
precisely only through a crisis: if teaching does not hit upon some sort of crisis, if it does
not encounter either the vulnerability or the explosiveness of an (explicit or implicit)
critical and unpredictable dimension, it has perhaps not truly taught; it has perhaps passed
on facts, passed on some information and some documents, with which the students or
the audience- the recipients- can for instance do what people during the occurrence of the
Holocaust precisely did with information that kept coming forth but that no one could
recognize, and that no one could therefore truly learn, read, or put to use.62

Felman is saying that the very nature of pedagogy transforms- or perhaps is revealedwhen immersed in crises studies and- in her experience- of the subsequent crises of those
studying and teaching them. It makes sense that these thoughts might come out of
studying and working with those who have undergone trauma, in fiction and real life.
However, it seems that classes and experiences like the one Felman describes could have
transformative and even ultimately positive effects in other disciplines; that will have to
be explored elsewhere. I will return to these questions around identity and witnessing in
relation to Felman in the next chapter.
Death, Trauma, and Identity
In reflecting on the 1972 Buffalo Creek disaster, Robert Jay Lifton discusses
“death equivalents” that induce rifts and cracks in the ties that bind people together
through geography, identity, and comfort when scarring experiences bring about a brush
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with death and all it represents.63 These “images of separation, disintegration, and
stasis…serve as psychic precursors” for death.64 Upon reading the testimonies of people
whose lives were torn asunder by the disaster, Lifton begins to note some of the
hallmarks of trauma magnified on a social scale that encompass individual feelings of
“psychic numbing”, an “unfocused rage” in relationships and toward others, and a
perpetual dwelling on the hand of God or other divine movements in effectively
destroying all that was known and familiar.65 Death narrowly came to many in Buffalo
Creek (indeed, one hundred twenty five of the 5,000 members of the community were
killed) and the entire community was thrust into a constant survival mode. However,
Lifton notes that focusing on survival when engaging with traumatized persons “suggests
that there has been death, and the survivor has therefore had a death encounter, and the
death encounter is central to his or her psychological experience.”66 These death
equivalents deserve further study in light of the experiences of LGBTQ Catholics, for it is
the likely case that many people find themselves living some of the classic symptoms of
trauma without going through an obvious death experience or death equivalent. What to
make of this? I suggest that there may be room for definitions around traumatic impetus
and symptoms to expand to the non-physical and immediate to attempt to encapsulate
some of what we’re seeing.
The Buffalo Creek flood and destruction also speaks to the feeling that groups of
people- and entire communities- seem to experience some sort of social trauma. For
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many years, Lifton, Kai Erikson, and others have gotten to know the individuals and
families whose lives were devastated by a flood due to human error and negligence by
the Pittson Coal Company. Almost immediately, the cracks in the social fabric revealed
themselves and got worse with time. As Erikson puts it in Everything In Its Path:
The worst damage, though, was done to the minds and spirits of the people who survived
the disaster, and it is there that one must begin the search for scars…It was as if every
man, woman, and child in the place- every one- was suffering from some combination of
anxiety, depression, insomnia, apathy, or simple “bad nerves”, and to make matters
worse, those complaints were expressed in such similar ways that they almost sounded
rehearsed.67

Erikson goes on to distinguish between individual trauma that acts as a “blow to the
psyche” from some brush with death that induces individuals to “withdraw into
themselves, feeling numbed, afraid, vulnerable, and very alone.”68 This trauma is
connected to a larger, relational phenomenon that he calls collective trauma:
By collective trauma…I mean a blow to the basic tissues of social life that damages the
bonds attaching people together and impairs the prevailing sense of communality. The
collective trauma works its way slowly and even insidiously into the awareness of those
who suffer from it, so it does not have the quality of suddenness normally associated with
“trauma.” But it is a form of shock all the same, a gradual realization that the community
no longer exists as an effective form of support and that an important part of the self has
disappeared. As people begin to emerge hesitantly from the protective shells into which
they have withdrawn, they learn that they are isolated and alone, wholly dependent upon
their own individual resources. “I” continues to exist, though damaged and maybe even
permanently changed. “You” continues to exist, although distant and hard to relate to.
But “we” no longer exist as a connected pair or as linked cells in a larger communal
body.69

These definitions- particularly collective trauma- are remarkable for their resonance with
the self-narration of the lives of LGBTQ Catholics in the community of the Church, for
so many of its call signs- the insidiousness and the damaged bonds without the necessity
for suddenness, and the damaged and altered self that seems severed from the warmth
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and structure of the community- speaks to the autobiographical accounts and stories of
LGBTQ Catholics from the previous chapter. Additionally, it speaks to the fact that the
majority, empowered population within the Church community- heterosexual, cisgender
individuals- could possibly be drawn into and be affected by this version of trauma as
well, even if they do not directly perpetrate it and negatively impact the lives of their
LGBTQ brethren. I will return to this notion toward the end of the thesis.
Throughout Erikson’s work, he references the interviews and autobiographical
accounts of the people of Buffalo Creek in describing their past and current experiences,
thoughts, and feelings. Here are the thoughts of one man reflecting on the role of the
Pittston Coal Company in the disaster that upended his community’s life:
I have a deep-seated resentment against Pittston, which probably isn’t normal, but I just
cannot help it. I resent the fact that no one even bothered to come to see if we were well,
needed anything, offer to help clean up, or seem to care what happened to us. This is
probably the wrong way to feel, but I just cannot help it.70

As Erikson notes, this man seems almost apologetic for his anger and seems perplexed
and distraught at the company’s abandonment. He calls this a sort of “paternal
relationship with the people of (Buffalo Creek)” that has been ruptured by a seeming lack
of care or concern. Later on, in the section on collective trauma, Erikson muses on the
ways in which individual desires, dreams, frustrations, and spirits are tied up in
transcendental visions of community. These “bear at least a figurative resemblance to an
organism…it is the community that cushions pain, the community that provides a context
for intimacy, the community that represents morality and serves as the repository for old
traditions.”71 Parishes, schools, and Catholic institutional communities from around the
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world would instantly feel at home with this imagery and language; indeed, Catholics
consider themselves to be united and wrapped up in the Body of Christ. If that
community seemingly turns on a person, either aggressively attacking or implicitly
abandoning him or her- not even “being bothered to see if (one) was well”- what does
that do to the psyche?
These and other writers- from Caruth to Lifton to Freud- all approach trauma
from different angles and disciplinary flourishes; however, almost all of them directly or
obliquely mention some of the reoccurring hallmarks of traumatic experience: distorted
and broken relationship, “imagery, symbolization, and meaning”, and a sense of dire
helplessness to sift through what is supposed to be right and truthful in the world. All of
these mirror some of the hallmarks of the psychological, emotional, and spiritual angst
undergone by LGBTQ Catholics who have experienced a range of negativity in their
respective communities as they came more fully into their own identity, whether it be
outright hostility, suspicion, or verbal & physical abuse. I hesitate in making full claims
of trauma in tenuous territory from the standpoint of an observer; however, it seems ever
more apparent that the language, metaphors, and narrative vehicles LGBTQ Catholics
have variously employed to describe their experiences live comfortably within the sphere
of a sort of communal, identity-based trauma.
Susan Brison’s Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of a Self, a narrative
account and work of philosophy pieced together in the years after her brutal assault and
near murder in the countryside of France, offers this thought about the messy intersection
of identity and trauma:
If we are socially constructed, as I believe we are, in large part through our group-based
narratives, the self is not a single, coherent, unified entity. Its structure is more chaotic,
with harmonious and contradictory aspects, like the particles of an atom, attracting and
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repelling each other, hanging together in a whirling, ever-changing dance that any
attempt at observation- or narration- alters.72

The act of articulating personal trauma and tying it to others is difficult, as Brison
acknowledges earlier, because one runs the risk of speaking for others, among other
things.73 Brison has a particular vantage point as a woman, a professional philosopher, a
rape survivor, and other identities, and any attempt to equivocate her clear experience of
trauma with the continual degradation of identity that many LGBTQ Catholics go
through would be problematic. However, comparisons of the peculiarities and rupture of
traumatic experience are necessary to attempt to glean whether the LGBTQ Catholic
experience might contain components of trauma itself, even outside of a singular physical
event.
Oppression and the Church
In perhaps an even more acute fashion, the language of oppression captures the
mental and psychological anguish amongst persons and groups that have been subjugated
within larger populations and communities. In her book Analyzing Oppression, Ann E.
Cudd presents her take on social groups and argues that
…It is individuals who suffer the injustices of oppression, though they can do so only as
members of social groups. It is because humans sort themselves into social groups and
find it nearly impossible as well as undesirable to extract themselves from social groups
that they can oppress each other.74

Cudd is careful to parse out the different forms of oppression; in doing so, she lends a
careful hand to an attempt to determine the state of play for the broader LGBTQ Catholic
community. Cudd defines subjective oppression as the notion or feeling that one is
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oppressed, whereas “objective oppression (is) the fact of oppression.”75 Correspondingly,
distinctions must be made between psychological oppression that deals with oppression
through affecting inner states, moods, and feelings- a sort of “psychic harm”- and
material oppression that lives within tangible physical harm to self or resources. All of
these forms of oppression intertwine and play off one another, Cudd argues; in the end,
they fuse into one “univocal concept” of oppression that spreads exponentially in
damaging lives and groups of people in similar ways, whether they be oppressed
“women…blacks…Jews…or homosexuals.”76 In attempting to apply some or all of these
forms of oppression to the lived experiences of LGBTQ Catholics, I tread carefully;
however, as Cudd and others cite, LGBTQ individuals have been one of the hallmark
oppressed groups of individuals in recent times. Such oppression within a broader faith
community such as the Catholic Church is particularly insidious and troubling because of
the mixed, often negative messaging that permeates the teaching, rhetoric, outreach, and
actions of some Church leaders and ordinary lay members toward their LGBTQ
community members. Some examples include use of language like “intrinsically
disordered” and the oft-quoted notion appropriated from St. Augustine of loving
individuals but hating their sin, with sin referencing homosexuality and/or homosexual
acts.77
Cudd explores possible origins of the psychological mechanisms and factors that
fuel oppression. Two particularly salient sources for her are Franz Fanon and Cynthia
Willett, who both underscore the need for recognition amidst violence in similar, yet
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distinct ways. In Fanon’s view, oppression destroys and obfuscates the recognition
necessary to live a live full of dignity and have a healthy sense of identity.78 Groups
develop superiority and inferiority complexes between the recognizers and the recognized
in a social ecosystem, and oppression functions as various forms of violence. This
violence answered with a form of counter-violence that “chases away the colonial rulers
and makes the oppressed people and organized people” that can self-achieve freedom.79
Willett cites Hegel to a greater extent than Fanon; however, although she defines freedom
differently than Hegel’s “masculinized” version. She too recognizes recognition as the
possible crux of freedom that defies slavery and oppression; however, this lies in her
definition of the self as embodied and socially connected “in the caress” that makes
human relationship and awareness of the tactile other as the foundation for the ethical
foundation of humanity.80 Cudd does not fully assert that Willett or anyone else
articulates a complete psychological foundation that anchors an overarching theory of
oppression; indeed, such universalizing efforts might be problematic in and of themselves
because they push the histories and harmful experiences of oppressed peoples to the side
of the shelf.81
The other crucial part of the psychological basis for oppression is the pervasive,
debilitating effects of stereotypes. She defines stereotypes as the “generalizations that we
make about persons based on characteristics that we believe they share with some
identifiable group.”82 Indeed, Cudd points out that the popular way in which cognitive
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psychologists define stereotypical thinking as a form of categorizing may be morally
wrong, even if it is common practice for human beings. In groups and out-groups are
formed within larger communities, and individuals are driven to cultivate and protect a
positive presence within the in-group for healthy self-identification. Cudd argues early on
that oppressed groups almost necessarily need oppressor groups, even if all the
individuals within that group do not intend to oppress or even are aware that they are
doing so. For that to happen, out-groups that are denigrated and excluded must exist.83
When all of these factors combine, a thriving oppression emerges that promotes some and
distorts others; the community may survive and seem viable on the surface, but acute
pain and a lack of recognition flourish underneath. Those oppressed may feel angry,
alienated, harmed, and abandoned; yet, many are psychologically co-opted into believing
in what others have deemed them to be. Cudd summarizes this entire process neatly:
Oppressed persons often acquiesce to and accept their own oppression because thy come
to believe in the stereotypes that represent their own inferiority, are weakened by those
stereotypes and even motivated to fulfill them.84

When these various characteristics of oppression are lent to an examination of
LGBTQ Catholics within the church communities, warning signs arise immediately.
They are second hand citizens to begin with, caught in a divide of identity and practice;
their embodied selves through sexual, loving relationships are demarcated as grave error,
sinful, and morally bereft of goodness. However, the language of inherent dignity
embedded in the Catechism, the words of bishops, and other parishioners keeps many
within the community. Indeed, the stereotypes of how gay and lesbian people function
and how they are meant to exist in this world seem to have permeated the psyche of many
83
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Catholics, both straight or LGBTQ, oppressor and oppressed. The Letter on the Pastoral
Care of Homosexual Persons defines homosexual acts as “essentially self-indulgent” and
“contrary to the creative wisdom of God.”85 In response, researchers and authors have
begun to look elsewhere for understanding on these topics, most notably to LGBTQ
Catholics themselves. As a bridge to Chapter 3 and how trauma and oppression might
debilitate identity, I turn to the work of Andrew Yip. He surveyed over one hundred gay
and lesbian Catholics in the United Kingdom about Church teaching on homosexuality,
relationships, and love, and a variety of responses and attitudes toward their own places
within the community were given.
A few that capture the different reactions- from incredulousness and anger to
acceptance and a curious adaptation- are seen below:
The expression of love cannot be wrong. Why would God give the desire without
allowing fulfillment? I know that I was born gay, so how can the expression of what my
nature is be sinful?
Respondent 119

This individual addresses arguments from natural law at their root by affirming his
identity as part of his created self, and expression of that identity as logically consistent
with the theological notions of God’s perfection in creation.
God created us in his own image- homosexual. He doesn’t make mistakes. Our essential
Christian vocation is the same as everyone else’s: to receive love and to give love. Most
human beings are clearly called to a loving, sexual, one-to-one relationship with another.
We are, too. It is our duty to fulfill our vocation to give love and receive love in stable
relationships. The Church is quite wrong in what it says about this, and doing severe
damage to the Body of Christ.
Respondent 121, his emphasis
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This person goes even further in stating the logical incoherency of the Church’s teachings
on love and homosexuality, respectively; his emphasis of the word “duty” stands in
contrast to Cardinal Ratzinger’s assertion that “justice requires” the opposition and
outlaw of same-sex unions earlier in Chapter 1. Respondent 121’s diction at the end of
his testimony about damage done to the “Body of Christ” adds another layer of
inextricability between the relationships between members of the Church and the
theological and metaphysical implications of love for Catholics. Unlike the first two,
Respondent 57 had a different take on his status in the Church and in the eyes of God:
Sodomy is condemned, not only by the Church, but by God in the Bible- the ultimate
guide to living! However, I am quite sure that two men really loving one another, even to
masturbation (mutual) but without sodomy, is quite acceptable to God. Sodomy is an
abomination in God’s sight. The term ‘making love’ so often means anything but that, but
simply giving way to lust and sinful, selfish gratification of one’s sexual lust.
Respondent 57, his emphasis86

This man has seemingly fully embraced his own second-class status because of Church
teaching and biblical tradition, yet fully embraces love within God’s eyes so long as it is
divorced from the act of physical love. As I have recurrently said throughout, it would be
presumptuous and ill considered to speculate on the inner motivations of LGBTQ
Catholics from a removed, secondary observer; however, this person’s words echo some
of the acceptance of subjugation through stereotypes and moral certainty of the majority
discussed in Cudd’s work, even though he still sees and seeks a path to a form of love
alongside those in his Church who see him as distinct and damaged.
To return to Cudd- what are some of the harms of this oppression, particularly in
cases when notions of God, divine order, and moral fates are brought into the picture? In
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her sixth chapter, she notes that oppression is linked and rooted in a language of trauma
that has three consequences: terror and psychological violence, humiliation and
degradation, and objectification.87 There are also three indirect psychological forces at
play: shame and low-self esteem, false consciousness, and deformed desires.88 Although
all do not apply in all cases and in all times for examining the varied experiences of
LGBTQ Catholics in the Church, I argue that there is a great deal of evidence that the
language of oppression and trauma whirl around in vicious cycle that has broken and
altered the spirits, psyches, and relational senses of many within the Church, whether in
direct or secondary fashions. In a spiritual sense, she says “trauma severely disrupts
human relationships and the trust that victims have in other people and the divine.”89
These accounts and surveys speak to a shattered trust in both God and other people,
which I will explore further in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3: Fragmented Identities
Having established both that communities must cultivate a concept of justice that
affirms identity and that trauma and oppression can debilitate the lives and psyches of
individuals, social groups, and the social ties that bind people together in community, we
must now turn to the question identity itself. Philosophers have long explored the nature
and function of personal identity, and most debate centers on whether identity is fixed,
malleable, or something in between, and what factors- memory, experience, social
circumstance, and so on- shape it.90 In recent years, scholars from multiple disciplines
(including philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and literary theory) have
increasingly explored identity through the lens of narrative. Narrative identity treats
humans as beings driven stories, and involves the process “by which people convey to
themselves and others who they are, how they came to be, and where they think their
lives may be going in the future.”91 For many narrative advocates, such as Paul Ricœur, a
French philosopher well known as a hermeneutic phenomenologist who studied narrative,
identity is inextricably tied up with ethical action and a search for rightness and meaning
within communities of layered, complex relationships. In Narrative and Time, Ricœur
attempts to solve the paradox of the fixed self and the changing self by arguing, as
Patrick Crowley summarizes, that “narrative…mediates the aporia of change and
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permanence through a process of ‘emplotment’ that organizes the contingencies of
existence into a coherent whole.”92
Assuming that human beings attempt to mentally, emotionally, physically, and
spiritually organize their lives into a “coherent whole”, I will explore narrative identity as
it relates to ethical decision-making and community life. Afterward, I will explore
autobiographical accounts of how LGBTQ Catholics variously describe their experience
of narrative identity in the Church as a sort of identity-based bifurcation and “forced
schizophrenia” as related to their sexual identities, their relationships, their membership
in Catholic communities, and their deep senses of selves and connections to God.93 Given
this reality, I will suggest that the Church recognize and admit the powerful damage that
its rhetoric and rulings inflicts on its LGBTQ members and claim that it cannot purport to
be an universal community centered around justice whilst simultaneously debilitating and
splintering the identities and lives of some of its members. There seems to be sufficient
evidence to classify this damage as deep-seated trauma on a similar level as other trauma
discussed in psychological and medical literature, which would have grave implications
on the legitimacy of the Catholic Church to claims of justice and would seem to require
reconfigured theology and rhetoric around homosexuality and love in order to take steps
toward reconciliation.
Narrative Identity and Ethical Choice
Narrative identity is committed to the notion that our experiences shape our
perceptions of ourselves and the broader meanings of life. We experience life’s moments
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in the present; in every following second, minute, hour, and year, we re-visit them and
shape them through the lens of narrative. Ricœur separates our identities into two parts,
idem and ipse; whereas idem represents the fixed part of “I” that remains, ipse- or
“Selfhood”- “…is analogous to narrative identity and involves the telling and retelling of
a life-story, whether factual or fictional, such that the figure of identity that emerges
offers a new insight into the self.”94 There is some part of us that constantly scours and
re-interprets the past even as we move through the present. Indeed, the study of memory
is intimately linked to how we self-conceive narratively. W. David Booth points to
cultural markers like family photo albums as sorts of memory- and, thus, identityshapers. A near-universal object like the photo album has a powerful hold on people.
Beyond the laughter, tears, and sentimentality it can cause in its observers as they fondly
(or hesitantly) recall past events and people, photo albums have immediate impact on our
present and future self-conception. For Booth, the photo album
shows memory in its fragile, vulnerable attempt to gather in and guard the past, lest it be
lost to the passage of time and to forgetting. And it casts some light on ways in which
what is remembered and forgotten are shaped by power, interest and selection.95

When memory is tied in, Booth finds kinship with Iris Marion Young and, to some
extent, Kwame Anthony Appiah by saying that “identity and difference/differentiation
are two sides of the same coin.”96 As discussed in Chapter 1, Young argues that it is
impossible to separate people from the differences and social markers that make them up;
this seems congruent with the notion that we cannot distance ourselves from the
narratives that encircle our lives, whether told to us or told by us.
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The vehicle for sharing identities is the story. Stories cannot exist in vacuums,
because their meaning comes out in their sharing. Sharing is often verbal and, more
broadly, linguistic in nature; therefore, much of the discourse around narrative identity
has come through analyzing the positive effects that things like the ‘power of
conversation’ have on human beings through adolescence, their formative young adult
years, and beyond, as found in the work of Jack McAdams and others. I affirm that the
broad study of narrative identity can be extraordinarily powerful in theory and practice;
however, it is clear that it is limited by what it leaves out of its own definition. Emotional
and non-linguistic bodily experiences seem to contribute just as much to lifelong,
evolving notions of the self and identity, especially when considering communities of
people- such as LGBTQ Catholics- who have undergone repeated attempts by outside
forces to strip physicality away from them. Much of the discourse has not made those
experiences crucial to narrative identity.
Although the theoretical discourse around narrative identity is strong, it has
troubling gaps and voids when it comes to integrating emotional and non-linguistic
experiences into its conception of how identity is shaped and formed over time.97 This
observation comes into sharper focus when analyzed in light of trauma. Traumatic
experiences- or, as Caruth and others might describe them, ‘non-experience[s]’- often
shape the very foundations of the identities and personal narratives of the affected.
Trauma has and continues to be defined in many ways, which I take as a good sign; the
fluidity, uncertainty, and fragility embedded in the effort to study trauma academically
calls for such an interdisciplinary, evolving definition. However, Cathy Caruth’s
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observation in her introduction to Trauma: Explorations in Memory that ‘to be
traumatized is precisely to be possessed by an image or an event’98 proves both effective
for this essay and haunting in its implications.
In defining narrative identity and relating it to redemption, Dan McAdams and
Kate McLean observe that ‘narrators who find redemptive meanings in suffering and
adversity…tend to enjoy higher levels of mental health, well-being, and maturity.’99 This
is entirely plausible and a desirable outcome for both those who have gone through
suffering and adversity and humanity in general. However, the scale100 on which
adversity and suffering can be measured is extremely broad, and there seems to be a
marked, if difficult to identify difference between someone recounting a lost job and
hearing a Holocaust survivor attempting to narrate the vicious brutalities and
dehumanizing events of concentration camps. I am not suggesting that the experiences of
those who have faced a sort of ‘smaller’ adversity are lesser or invalid; on the contrary, I
simply mean that the very process of storytelling, narration, and lived experience might
be different in ways for trauma victims, and we must recognize that.
Debilitating influences such as trauma, oppression, and violence can emotionally
and psychologically debilitate separate members of the community, not just those directly
victimized; I will cover this more extensively in the next chapter. In light of Cathy Caruth
and others’ discussions of the devastating impact trauma can have on individuals and
communities, it is clear that those who are working with narratives in interdisciplinary
ways must confront the reality that victims of trauma do not- and, perhaps, cannot98
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approach or tell their own stories in the same ways others can. The formation of a
positive, healthy narrative identity is possible despite- and, as McAdams, McLean, and
others might suggest, because of- adversity and negative life experiences; however, the
very definition of narrative identity must evolve and expand to acknowledge the fact that
the telling and listening that lie at its heart may often seem ‘impossible’ for survivors of
trauma. To this end, we would do well to dive into the lives and words of LGBTQ
Catholics themselves, and reflect on narration and trauma through the work of Dugan
McGinley.
Narrating Gay Catholicism
In his 2006 work Acts of Faith, Acts of Love, Dugan McGinley explores the
tensions inherent in the identities and lives of LBGTQ Catholics in America and the
possibilities offered by autobiographical self-narrative. McGinley situates his work
amidst the small but growing body of critical literature examining the Church’s official
teaching around homosexuality, the broader LGBTQ community, marriage, and full
participation in the Church.101 McGinley admits his own limitations in his book: he
addresses only the stories and autobiographical work of gay Catholic men in recent
decades and does not attempt to speak to the complex problems of lesbian Catholic
women or fuller LGBTQ community. Nonetheless, he hopes that the “liberatory
principles of his analysis” can be used more broadly in the Church, especially given “the
conflation of gay men and lesbians in official documents.”102 By utilizing autobiography,
McGinley shows a “self in context” that stands in rich contrast the isolated way in which
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the church talks about sexuality.103 He briefly discusses the work of James Olney and
other autobiographical theorists in identifying the “complex interplay between the autos
(self) and the bios (life), constantly articulating and re-articulating a “textual self” over
the course of a lifetime. In the contexts of sexuality and Catholicism, the
autobiographical account stands on its own as a truthful, authentic counterpoint to official
teaching that has not taken the first-person vantage point into consideration for
centuries.104
By embracing storytelling and autobiographical telling, the broader LGBTQ
population both co-creating and revealing an integrated community that is part of many
other previously established communities. Autobiography brings this reality into focus by
transforming it into testimony and rendering “in a particularly direct and faithful way the
experience and vision of a people.”105 LGBTQ Catholics who actively live their identity
have been denied a voice in articulating their lives within official Church circles and
reflecting on and disseminating Church teaching; thus, it seems that this sort of
storytelling is a method for taking matters into their own hands to reveal truth. As
McGinley puts it,
Although the majority of the autobiographers I examine in this study are not aware o the
many theoretical concerns relating to this genre, they do have a sense that telling one’s
life story is vital to becoming a self and finding one’s voice. In doing so, they challenge
those who would marginalize them, and they do justice work for the entire
community…they perform a service by bringing flesh and blood to church teaching that
effectively disembodies them, and by giving life to otherwise theoretical moral
arguments.106
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These narrative searches for identity and self-knowledge differ in style and content, but
many point to a similar desire for “places we visit…(and) places we can’t go…and a
longing so real it becomes a place, an identity, a home” within the complex, interlocking
experiences that make up this community that centers around sexual identities that have
been rejected and cast aside by powerful social structures, including the Catholic
Church.107
Within these autobiographical accounts, common themes emerge: emotional,
psychological, and spiritual angst, depression, isolation, anger, and numbness. I will
provide a small sample of some of these accounts to allow the words of gay Catholic
individuals to speak for themselves, and to provide a connection to claims of inflicted
trauma and oppression in the following chapter. I begin with the words of an Italian
American gay Catholic who remembered his childhood isolation in his “Memoirs of a
South Philly Sissy”:
If there was one word to describe my childhood, it is “lonely.” An overwhelming,
unbearable loneliness. Loneliness walked through my days, became my nightmares. I
remember Christmas days when I sat alone near the tree in the living room, looking into a
room full of relatives and family friends, feeling left out and thinking how unwelcome I’d
be if they knew I was queer.108

Note how he frames his loneliness as absolute, constant, and “overwhelming”; even
amidst family circumstances and a religious holiday that is supposed to be joyful in the
Christian and Catholic tradition, Christmas, he feels afraid and separate from the rest of
his loved ones by his very nature. This echoes Caruth’s definition of trauma as rupturing
daily experience and turning it into “non-experience”.109 Although Mecca and the other
witnesses cited in McGinley said that they knew their identity was innate from childhood,
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they came into fuller awareness of that truth at different times in their young lives; as
Frank DeCaro put it, “I was born gay. It just took me sixteen years to figure it out.”110
Despite this shared sense of some innate knowledge of their rightful identity,
many of the autobiographical accounts spoke about how almost everything in their
immediate surroundings and community structures forced them to bifurcate their lives
into different spheres. The words of Richard Rodriguez are telling:
For I knew nothing in the world was so dangerous as love, my kind of love…from an
early age I needed to learn caution, to avert my eyes, to guard my speech, to separate
myself from myself…Or to reconstruct myself in some eccentric way…My eyes looking
one way, my soul another. My motive could not be integrated with my body, with act or
response, or, indeed, approval.111

The implications of some of the phrases Rodriguez uses, such as separation and
reconstruction of the self and the impossibility of integrating “motive…and body,” are
profound. This sort of internal splintering intuitively seems psychologically and
emotionally damaging. It is difficult to measure how that damage compounds and shifts
when tied to spiritual health. This splintering carried on into adolescence and young
adulthood for many of the men cited by McGinley. They began to hear more and more
derogatory and inflammatory language and rhetoric from their peers, families, and
community members about LGBTQ people, such as “queer” and “faggot”, which created
a “climate of fear” that sowed a deep resistance in the men to articulate and take
ownership of their sexual identity.112
This climate can create a deep sense of self-loathing and shame, and as Fenton
Johnson shares, can destroy one’s sense of being able to experience love in a healthy
manner:
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I had so deeply and profoundly accepted this given that I had no awareness of my own
self-contempt…I had never heard words to describe the desires that of their own accord
visited me. A man loving a man- I had never read of this or seen images of it; I had never
experienced it in any way other than the recesses of my own desire, a place so ugly (I
assumed) it was beyond the pale of words. To defend myself against my desire I
constructed an elaborate wall around my heart, so high no one could see in and I could
not see out.113

These perceptions of self ebb and flow over time with each individual, and some Catholic
stories are brighter than others, as McGinley notes, depending on the particular responses
and experiences of affirmation from family, community members, and Church figures.
However, the lingering negativity still taints much of the experience of Catholic life for
LGBTQ individuals. The language embedded throughout these accounts that conjures
imagery of blocking others out, feeling helpless and angry, and not being able to escape
perceptions of despair for barely a moment all resonate with traumatic language and, in a
different sense, narratives of the oppressed. These recent autobiographical efforts
documented by McGinley and others show how the Church must recognize this reality
for these voices all tell of “how being gay is deeply embedded in sense of self...the
church would like to separate being gay from doing gay, but it is not that simple”114 If the
Catholic community truly wishes to treat all its members with dignity and justice in the
image and likeness of God, it might look in reconciliation to the words of LGBTQ
Catholics like Andrew Holleran, who identifies sexual identity as “the thing around
which our deepest wishes coalesce: the desire for love, trust, fidelity, stability, a home, a
companion, a future, all of that.”115
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What light can be shed on the process of identity from these explorations of
trauma, oppression, and autobiographical telling? It is clear that trauma, as defined by
processes of storytelling and accounts, affects multiple levels of a community from direct
participant to secondary and tertiary observers. That narrative process of discovering and
articulating identity seems to have been negatively warped for all involved. In Felman’s
work, the pain, confusion, and denial of the Holocaust survivors of their own lived
realities comes through in the tension between their urges to repress their experiencesturn them into ‘non experiences’- and their need to bear witness to themselves and others,
to, as the second survivor phrases it, “deal with our feelings, understand our
experience[s].”116 This does not mean that the ability to form positive narrative identity is
totally broken. In both the deeper way that the witnesses’ accounts were ‘freeing’117 and
in the relief, growth, and discovery that came from the students’ initial trauma as
witnesses to raw testimony, it seems that both parties’ narrative selves survived to the
other side, as it were.
The earlier definition of narrative identity as overcoming adversity and “finding
redemption” seems inadequate and out of place compared to the traumatic realities
explored here. What is needed is a renewed definition of narrative identity that deals with
the uncomfortable reality that peoples’ capacities to process experience and live it out in
a healthy fashion are profoundly different due to individual and social trauma. These
traumas are not pleasant for all involved, and it may seem tempting to ignore the damage
brought forth into others’ lives. However, if we accept narrative identity as one of the
major ways people encounter the world and themselves- and if we wish to study and
116
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employ that identity in a positive manner on personal lives and on communities- then we
must address the fact that storytelling is not a objective process and tool that people can
activate equally and automatically. The daily experience of encountering life can be
distorted into a fragmented process where lingering questions about one’s self and place
in the world reoccur and haunt a person like ghosts.
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Conclusions, Limitations, and Steps Forward
As I stated at the beginning of this thesis, I wade into this topic with caution, for it
is easy to generalize and obfuscate the matter at hand when personal lives, relationships,
and divine implications are at stake. However, I argue that this thesis makes a strong case
that the Catholic Church must take a deep look at the ways its teaching, rhetoric, and
representatives positively or negatively affect the psyches and functioning of its LGBTQ
individuals, families, and communities across the United States and the world. If the
Church desires to live out justice rooted in emancipatory dignity and the notion that all
people are to flourish as created in the image and likeness of God, then communities
where identities are affirmed and oppressive and trauma-inducing actions and words are
cast out are necessary. Catholicism’s doctrine, teaching, and rhetoric around LGBTQ
individuals is not static or unchangeable, although the evolution of its application might
seem to move at a glacial pace. Church leaders must recognize that, by excluding the
LGBTQ community from the full participation of its teaching on love, relationship,
marriage, identity, and all else, it performs serious harm to not only LGBTQ individuals
and families, it damages their own families, friends, school and parish communities, and
broader social circles. Furthermore, the Church’s moral weight and respect in the global
dialogue around justice, compassion, and love may continue to be seen as hypocritical if
injustice and damage continues to be perpetuated by its own hand. I was limited in my
effort by time, resources, and my external vantage point as an Catholic ally into the
trauma and oppression experienced by many within and outside the Church. Thus, my
proposals for steps forward include projects and suggestions that I hope a diverse chorus
of scholars, practitioners, parishioners, and decision-makers take up and make their own.
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Firstly, there is a need for more qualitative and quantitative surveying about the
lives and experiences of LGBTQ Catholics around the world. More and more
autobiographical voices must rise to the public square, whether they be in the form of
interviews, essays, books, academic chapters, social media or blog posts, and all else
found in our rapidly evolving shared social medium. Creative and honest self-telling
clearly brings truths and moves people in deep ways, and those voices are desperately
needed in order to paint a clear, sober picture of the realities facing LGBTQ people in the
Church. This is tied to a greater interdisciplinary need to explore the nature of trauma as
it relates to identity and community. I made an effort to present some aspects of trauma
theory on its own merits in this thesis in order to let readers wrestle with whether it can
apply to the lives of LGBTQ individuals in the Church, even those who have not directly
experienced assault, physical violence, or other characteristic trauma inducing events.
The disciplines of philosophy, theology, psychology, sociology, literature, cognitive
science, and more must come together to explore how identities and bodies seem to be
fractured over time by a distortion of self-worth and cohesion, especially in the light of a
divine sense of ‘rightness’.
Secondly, the Church must take ownership of its vision of justice; although that
may seem an unwieldy and impractical demand for a sprawling institution that defines
itself as having both physical, earthly dimensions and a universal, transcendental
community, practical efforts must be undertaken if any notion of justice is to be extended
to the LGBTQ community. This may eventually take the form of admittance of fault,
wrongdoing, and inflicted trauma and oppression; however, the Church moves slowly,
and it would be foolish to anticipate the ways this process might fully unfold. It seems
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apparent, though, that some of the logical inconsistencies of the theological basis for
differential treatment of LGBTQ Catholics must be addressed and changed in order to
articulate any renewed sense of justice and dignity for the entire Church community.
Other work can and must be done to fully explore the exact changes to theology;
however, if the Catechism of the Church continues to view homosexual inclination as
“objectively disordered” and acts as “intrinsically disordered” and roots that position in
Scripture and natural law, then it is near-certain that cyclical trauma and oppression will
continue to debilitate the lives of LGBTQ Catholics.118 I do not presume to speculate on
how exactly this can or must unfold, although in acknowledgment of the complexity of
the issue, I look to McGinley’s reference of Mark Jordan’s prediction:
Correcting Catholic teachings on homosexuality is not only or mainly a matter of
proposing amendments to specific documents. The official doctrine is more deeply
embedded than that. It is more deeply connected to old arrangements of institutional
power. Changing the language without reforming the teaching would be useless, even if it
were possible. The most important relations between Catholicism and homosexuality are
not embedded in official propositions about homosexuality, nor even in official
regulations for homosexual behavior. The forces at work here are not only the forces of
words.119

Thirdly, allies and witnesses around the world must continue to voice that the
LGBTQ community is not alone on its journey toward acceptance, flourishing, and a just
and full life within and outside the Church. Like all movements toward justice, key
watershed moments seemingly open the floodgates toward greater understanding,
processing, and change. One area where I see this happening is bringing the lessons and
truths of trauma, identity, justice, and community further into the storytelling realm, in
whatever form that might take.. Stories like Uncle Tom’s Cabin and The Things They
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Carried may not have been factual accounts, but they spoke deeper truths that moved
people into action. We may very well be on the verge of such a moment for the Catholic
Church. It will take all of this and notes I undoubtedly miss here in this effort.
On that note, Pope Francis recently released his long anticipated post-Synodal
apostolic exhortation on the family, Amoris Laetitia. It would be naïve to attempt to fully
unpack the document given its length and complexity; however, a few excerpts from the
exhortation offer a strange paradox. The language of the exhortation contains both signs
of hope about recognizing the complexities of the family and love lives of Catholics and
a continued narrative that the sexual identities and lives of LGBTQ Catholics are
problems to be solved, rather than realities to be celebrated. Francis highlights the need
for conscience in engaging in moral and spiritual decision making and advocates for a
global admittance of complexities of family life throughout the document, ranging from
situations of the divorced and remarried to the plight of families torn apart by unfortunate
circumstances. However, when discussing homosexuality in sections 250 and 251, the
line in the sand remained clear:
The Church makes her own the attitude of the Lord Jesus, who offers his boundless love to each
person without exception. During the Synod, we discussed the situation of families whose
members include persons who experience same-sex attraction, a situation not easy either for
parents or for children. We would like before all else to reaffirm that every person, regardless of
sexual orientation, ought to be respected in his or her dignity and treated with consideration,
while ‘every sign of unjust discrimination’ is to be carefully avoided, particularly any form of
aggression and violence. Such families should be given respectful pastoral guidance, so that those
who manifest a homosexual orientation can receive the assistance they need to understand and
fully carry out God’s will in their lives.120

And, immediately afterward:
In discussing the dignity and the mission of the family, the Synod Fathers observed that, “as for
proposals to place unions between homosexual persons on the same level as marriage, there are
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absolutely no grounds for considering homosexual unions to be in any way similar or remotely
analogous to God’s plan for marriage and family.”121

These two lines show how the contradiction of Church rhetoric lives on. Although we
should respect dignity, attempt to assess the realities of lived situations of Catholic
families, and avoid all “unjust discrimination”, unions and relationships are not even
“remotely analogous” to heterosexual ones, and the spirit and letter of “intrinsic disorder”
live on.122 This flies in the face of the lived testimony and philosophical analysis in this
limited work and the countless voices from elsewhere, and underscores the urgency for
an accelerated effort to bring all parties involved to the table so joy and justice can
replace numbing, anger, and despair.
Despite the foreboding tone of the ending of this thesis, all is not lost. The very
act of identifying different sorts of traumas and oppression publicly acts as a small crack
in structure of injustice and damage, and starts processes that unfold in real time in
communities around the world every day. The testimonies referenced in this work show
how both academic work and narratives serve as purveyors of “reconciliatory
emancipation,” as Toinette Eugene phrases it, and help bring about both pragmatic, direct
change and sacramental healing.123 Blame, fault, and justice are necessary, but they
unavoidably go hand in hand with healing and reconciliation in the end. In this sense,
philosophy helps us casts light onto darkness. Indeed, to quote Matthew 10:27:
What I say to you in the dark, tell in the light; and what you hear whispered, proclaim
from the housetops.124
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